We first discuss certain problems with the classical probabilistic approach for assessing forensic evidence, in particular its inability to distinguish between lack of belief and disbelief, and its inability to model complete ignorance within a given population. We then discuss Shafer belief functions, a generalization of probability distributions, which can deal with both these objections. We develop a new calculus of belief functions which does not use the much criticized Dempster rule of combination, and which yields very natural notions of conditioning and independence, consistent with their classical counterparts. We then apply this calculus to some classical forensic problems like the various island problems and the problem of parental identification. If we impose no prior knowledge apart from assuming that the culprit or parent belongs to a given population (something which is possible in our setting), then our answers differ from the classical ones when uniform or other priors are imposed. We can actually retrieve the classical answers by imposing the relevant priors, so our setup can and should be interpreted as a generalization of the classical methodology, allowing more flexibility. We show how our calculus can be used to develop an analogue of Bayes' rule, with belief functions instead of classical probabilities. We also discuss consequences of our theory for legal practice.
Introduction and motivation
It has been debated for several decades as to what extent theories of probability, are useful and/or suitable for assessing the value of evidence in legal and forensic settings, see e.g. [12] , [8] , [18] , [1] , [24] . The debate mainly concentrates on the question whether or not the classical theory of probability, by which we mean the theory following Kolmogorov's axioms, is suitable in legal problems.
The current dominant view proposes that we should use the classical probability axioms in court, in particular the axiom of additivity, i.e. P (A)+ P (B) = P (A∪B) whenever A and B are disjoint. We are typically interested in an event, often denoted by G, that a given individual is the donor of a DNA profile, is the criminal in a certain crime, is the father of a certain child, or likewise. The main tool in this dominant view is Bayes' formula
where E denotes relevant evidence, and whereḠ denotes the complement of G (or another set such that G ∩Ḡ = ∅).
Bayes' formula transforms prior odds
into posterior ones
by multiplying the prior odds by the likelihood ratio
. We will give more detail on the legal practice and the use of Bayes' rule in Section 7, but note that the use of Bayes' formula presupposes the idea that all quantities of interest, including the prior, can indeed be expressed as probabilities satisfying the usual Kolmogorov axioms.
The alternative view insists that classical probability theory, with the axioms of Kolmogorov, is in many cases not suitable to be used in court or in forensics, for various reasons. We adhere to this alternative view, since we believe that there are situations in which the axioms of Kolmogorov are too restrictive, and we start by giving a number reasons and examples to support this claim.
First, it has been observed by many that the classical theory cannot distinguish between lack of belief and disbelief. Here, disbelief is associated with evidence indicating the negation of a proposition, whereas lack of belief is associated with not having evidence at all. As Shafer [20] puts it, the classical theory does not allow one to withhold belief from a proposition without according that belief to the negation of the proposition. When we want to apply a theory of probabilities to legal issues, this becomes a relevant issue. Indeed, if certain exculpatory evidence in a case is dismissed, then this may result in less belief in the innocence of the suspect, but it gives no further indication for guilt.
The second shortcoming of the classical theory is its inability to model complete ignorance within a given population. We first give two examples, and then elaborate on this issue. Example 1.1. In The Netherlands, a well known court case concerned a traffic accident caused by a car with two passengers. Although it was not disputed that the car caused the accident, it was unclear which of the two passengers was driving. The classical solution to deal with this, is to impose a fifty-fifty prior on the two passengers, but this is in fact not corresponding to reality. In reality we know that one of the two passengers drove, but we are otherwise ignorant. This cannot be modeled with classical probability.
This example can be generalized into the well known and classical island problem: Example 1.2. In the classical version of the island problem (see e.g. [23] and [3] ) a crime has been committed on an island, making it a certainty that an inhabitant of the island committed it. In the absence of any further information, the classical point of view is to assign a uniform prior probability over all inhabitants concerning the question who is the culprit. The combination of assigning probability 1 to the collection of all inhabitants and probability 0 to each individual is impossible under the classical axioms of probability, although this may be exactly the prior one needs and wants to impose.
The last two examples may need some elaboration since it may not be so obvious why ignorance cannot be properly modeled by a uniform distribution over all possibilities.
Firstly, when we look at the island problem in Example 1.2, it is simply the case that we do not have information pointing to any individual. We do have group information, but no individual information. With a uniform distribution over the group, you nevertheless make a statement about each individual. This is very relevant in legal cases since these are against individuals, not against a whole population.
Secondly, it is simply not the case that a uniform distribution does not convey any information. Even in a frequentistic context, a uniform distribution tells us something when we repeat the experiment many times. Or, to phrase the same point differently, having probability 1 2 for head to come up in a coin flip, is information.
Finally, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness in taking a uniform distribution as model for ignorance, since it depends on the possible outcomes that one wishes to consider. If for whatever reason certain outcomes are split into several ones, or lumped together, the new uniform distribution is in general inconsistent with the original one. To give an example, suppose that a nurse experiences the death of many of her patients, to the extent that she becomes a suspect for murder. Labeling the nurse by L, we can take the two-point space {L guilty, L not guilty}. Alternatively, the three-point space {A crime has not been committed, A crime has been committed and L is guilty, A crime has been committed and L is not guilty}. In the first choice, a uniform prior would lead to a prior probability of guilt of 1/2 for L, in the second case it leads to a prior probability of 1/3.
We will apply the theory we are about to develop to Example 1.2 in Section 4. There we will see that using an uninformative prior, which is possible in our theory, leads to a different result than using a uniform prior.
The fact that these priors lead to different results confirms that these priors are really distinct: a uniform prior is not a prior representing ignorance, and using a uniform prior does not lead to the same results as using a prior that does represent ignorance.
Finally, we give an example in which a non-uniform prior is provided by statistics about previous similar cases. Example 1.3. Statistics indicate that when a married women is murdered, in 40% of the cases the husband is responsible for this. It has been suggested [2] to use this number as a prior for guilt of the husband when his wife is murdered. This, however, does not seem fair: a general statistic about husbands should not be used as evidence in the case of this specific husband. In the absence of evidence regarding this particular husband, it would be better to impose ignorance about the possible guilt of the husband. This is not possible in the classical theory.
The examples suggest that the usual axioms of probability may not always be appropriate in legal and forensic settings. In particular, there are at least two (related) problems: (1) the additivity of probabilities, that is, P (A)+P (B) = P (A∪B) if A and B are disjoint, is not always desirable, and (2) there is no way to model ignorance in a given population in the classical theory. We are not the first ones to observe this, of course. Already back in the seventies of the previous century, there have been at least two major attempts, by Cohen [7] and Shafer [20] respectively, to develop a theory of probabilities, or generalizations thereof, for legal settings outside the realm of the axioms of Kolmogorov. However, both these attempts have been criticized fiercely (references below), for various and different reasons, and nowadays they are not used at all in assessing evidence in legal settings.
This history fits in a classical pattern in science at large. There is a certain theory (in our case classical probability axioms) which is supposed to describe or explain certain phenomena (in our case dealing with uncertainty in legal and forensic context). Then certain problems or anomalies arise (for our case, see the examples above). Nevertheless, despite these anomalies, the theory is often uphold, often mainly by the lack of an acceptable alternative. In our case, the proposed alternatives of Cohen and Shafer seemed to have too many problems in themselves, and as such they were not acceptable and the classical theory prevailed. The philosopher Thomas Kuhn described this generic process for instance in [16] , together with many examples from the history of science.
We think that Shafer's approach is the most promising when it comes down to application possibilities and general acceptance, since it is conceptually simpler and closer to classical probability than the approach of Cohen. This is the reason that in this article we restrict our attention to Shafer's approach.
Before we introduce belief function properly, we should review for what reasons Shafer's belief functions have been essentially ignored in the forensic and mathematical literature, other than being criticized. To be sure, they are not completely ignored, but they are typically framed as somewhat of a curiosity and not taken very seriously, for instance in Dawid's otherwise excellent notes [8] . We list three main points of concern that can be found in the literature, and briefly indicate our position. First of all, Shafer himself reports in [21] that many of his critics rejected his belief functions because of the lack of a suitable betting interpretation. In other words, it is the interpretation that seemed to be an obstacle. Shafer argues in [21] that no such behavioral interpretation is necessary. In our companion paper to the current one [15] , we do however formulate a very natural betting interpretation of Shafer's belief functions. We note though that this particular criticism does not play a role in the current article.
A second, and much more important point of concern about Shafer's belief functions can be found for instance in [19] and [11] . In both references, the main reason to reject Shafer's belief functions is that the calculus of these belief functions, as put forward in the so called Dempster rule of combination, is arbitrary, not well founded and therefore unacceptable. This rule is supposed to describe how different belief functions should be combined into a new one. Let us be clear about this point: we also reject Dempster's rule and the calculus that stems from it. In the companion paper [15] we motivate this rejection in great detail. Despite this rejection, in the current article we do develop a very useful calculus of belief functions without using Dempster's rule. The only thing we need is a proper rule for conditioning, and this is much less controversial, if at all. This should take care of the points raised in [19] and [11] .
A third point of concern is articulated, again, in [11] . The very fact that a belief function can allow zero belief to both an event and its complement, makes it, according to [11] , inadequate to be used in legal matters, where a decision has to be taken, and where not making a decision is not an option. However, we do not think that this objection is well founded, since it seems to mix up the notion of belief with the act of making a decision about declaring someone guilty. Based on a belief function which assigns belief zero to both guilt and innocence, a suspect will not be convicted. Actually, belief functions seem to do more justice to the situation, since a judge will make a certain decision only if there is enough evidence. One should only convict someone if the belief in the hypothesis that he or she is actually guilty, is high enough, and this does not seem to have anything to do with the fact that the belief in a proposition and its complement can both be zero.
Finally, in [17] it is questioned whether or not belief functions respect some 'rules' of reasoning when it comes to knowledge. For the most part, Pearl's criticism does not apply to our theory and how we want to use it, and we hope to convince the reader that there are many situations in which the use of belief functions is very reasonable, by supplying a number of examples.
The goal of the present article is to convince the forensic and legal communities of the fact that Shafer's belief functions can be put to good use in legal and forensic matters, by developing an uncontroversial calculus, thereby taking away the main obstacle for the use of Shafer's theory and providing the communities with an acceptable extension of the classical theory. We do this theoretically, but most and for all also practically, by computing (conditional) belief functions in classical problems like the island problem and parental identification problems. Furthermore, we show through examples how we can use an analogue of Bayes' formula. Shafer's belief functions can take care of the problems noticed in the two examples above. Indeed, they are so general that they can distinguish between lack of belief and disbelief, and they are also flexible enough to be able to model complete prior individual ignorance.
We want to stress that the belief functions of Shafer are a generalization of classical probabilities, and that everything that can be modeled with classical probability theory, can therefore also be modeled with these belief functions. If there is a good reason to take a classical informative prior, the theory allows for that. We lose nothing. As expected, having no prior information leads to different outcomes when it comes to the question whether someone is guilty or not. This is only reasonable we think, since the classical procedure imposes a prior which is legally problematic.
Belief functions can be interpreted epistemologically, that is, relating to knowledge of facts rather than to facts themselves. In the current article, we will not explore this in any detail. In the companion paper [15] we do include a discussion of this epistemological interpretation, including a more specified betting interpretation and the relation of beliefs to frequencies.
Although we do address and resolve the problems with the classical theory that we mentioned above, this does not mean that the theory as we present it solves all problems. The difficulty of quantifying weights of evidence is just one example of a problem we are still facing in our theory, as is the choice of the relevant population. Despite this, we think the theory it is a significant step forward, and perhaps it is hard to imagine how a mathematical theory would satisfactorily solve these issues anyway.
On the theoretical part we will in this article be as brief as possible, but we make sure that the current paper remains self-contained. An in-depth and extensive theoretical development is carried out in the companion paper to the current paper in [15] , including an extensive discussion of betting interpretations, a law of large numbers for belief functions, a thorough discussion of independence, a detailed analysis of Dempster's rule, and an in-depth discussion of the interpretation of belief functions. For the forensic and legal applications in the current paper, such an in-depth mathematical study is not necessary, but we do note the fact that the subject is very interesting from both a theoretical and an applied perspective, and we plan to develop it much more in the future.
The current paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce belief functions and summarize their main properties. In Section 3 we develop our calculus, based on conditioning and independence. Next we apply the theory in Section 4 to the classical island problems, and in Section 5 to the problem of parental identification. In Section 6 we explain our analogue of Bayes' rule, and finally in Section 7 we conclude by discussing some consequences of our theory for legal and forensic casework.
The basic definitions
Let Ω be a finite outcome space, for instance the members of a certain population. We want to make statements about the elements of Ω in the presence of uncertainty, like saying something about who is the culprit in a certain crime. The classical way to do this is by means of a suitable probability distribution on Ω. A probability distribution assigns a nonnegative weight p(ω) to each element ω ∈ Ω in such a way that the total weight is equal to 1. We may, for instance, express out uncertainty about who is the culprit by means of such a probability distribution. The probability that the culprit can be found in a subset A of Ω is then equal to
The probability measure P can be interpreted as subjective, frequentistic or otherwise, depending on the context and personal taste. The weight p(ω) represents the probability or confidence in the outcome ω, and P (A) represents our probability or confidence in an outcome which is contained in A. In classical probability theory, a subset of Ω is also called an event or sometimes also a hypothesis, we make no distinction between the tow phrases. The probability measure P describes the probability of all such events or hypotheses. Next we define basic belief assignments and belief functions. The difference between a basic belief assignment and a probability distribution, is that the former assigns weights to nonempty subsets of Ω rather than to individual outcomes. We write 2 Ω for the collection of all subsets of Ω. Whereas p(ω) represents the probability or confidence in the outcome ω, m(C) represents our confidence in an outcome in C which is not specified further. It may appear that there is not much difference between P and m, but in fact there is. The crucial difference between P and m is that the weight of a subset C of Ω is not immediately related to the weights of the elements or subsets of C. For instance, if we have no clue whatsoever about the outcome, that is, if we have no information at all, then we may express this by putting m(Ω) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all strict subsets of Ω. Or we may take m({a, b}) = 1/2 and simultaneously m({a}) = m({b}) = 0, for a, b ∈ Ω, stating that we have evidence for the union of a and b, but no further information to distinguish between them.
It is also possible that a basic belief functions only assigns positive weight to singletons. In such a case, we are back in the classical situation. The quantity m(C) is sometimes referred to as the weight of the evidence that points to C.
We should view m as the analogue of p in the classical description above. We next define the analogue of P , which is called a belief function. We want to quantify how much belief we can assign to a subset A of Ω. To this end, we consider all sets C in Ω with C ⊆ A, which are precisely the events whose occurrence implies the occurrence of A. The belief in a set A now is the sum of the weights of all subsets of A. In terms of evidence, the belief in A is the total weight of all evidence which implies A. We next discuss a number of examples which should convince the reader that in many situations there are natural belief functions which adequately describe the situation. Example 2.3. Suppose we want to state our beliefs about a suspect being guilty or innocent, so Ω = {guilty, innocent} is our outcome space. If the only evidence we have is evidence of weight p that the suspect is innocent, and no further information, then we have m({innocent}) = p, m({guilty}) = 0 and m(Ω) = 1 − p. The weight of 1 − p assigned to Ω should be interpreted as the weight of ignorance. Notice that the belief that the suspect is guilty is not equal to 1 minus the belief that the suspect is innocent. The corresponding belief function Bel is given by Bel({guilty}) = 0, Bel({innocent}) = p and Bel(Ω) = 1.
Example 2.4. The function m for which m(Ω) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all other A ⊆ Ω is a basic belief assignment. The corresponding belief function assigns belief 1 to Ω and belief zero to all strict subsets of Ω. This belief function expresses total ignorance, except for the fact that the outcome must be in Ω. As such it addresses the problem noticed in Example 1.2.
Example 2.5. (Probability distributions) Every probability distribution is a belief function, as we already indicated. To see that, let P : 2 Ω → [0, 1] be a probability distribution. Set m({ω}) = P ({ω}) for all ω ∈ Ω and m(C) = 0 for all C such that |C| > 1. Then we get
for every A ⊆ Ω. Probability distributions are belief functions for which the corresponding basic belief assignment only assigns positive weight to singletons. If m(C) > 0 for some C with |C| > 1, then Bel is not a probability distribution because it not additive: for any nonempty, disjoint A, B ⊆ Ω such that A ∪ B = C we find
In concrete situations, the basic belief assignment can very well be based on classical probabilistic considerations when it is reasonable to do so. Here is an important example which we will discuss in full detail in Section 4.
Example 2.6. (The island problem) Let X = {1, . . . , N +1} be the population of the island. At the scene of the crime a DNA profile Γ is found which we know has frequency p ∈ (0, 1] in the population. This means that a randomly chosen person has probability p to have the characteristic, independent of the other individuals. We remark that this assumption is in the realm of classical probability theory. This is reasonable since the frequency interpretation of classical probability works well within the context of DNA profiles.
Our basic belief assignment should capture our prior knowledge, that is, prior to the fact that we found the DNA profile at the crime scene. We have prior knowledge about two different things: (1) we know that we have selected S uniformly at random from the population, and (2) we know the population frequency of the DNA profile to be p. Both these items can be satisfactorily described with a classical probability distribution, and with classical independence assumptions. This leads to the following basic belief assignment, prior to the evidence.
We set Ω = X × X × {0, 1} N +1 and let C : Ω → X, S : Ω → X and Γ i : Ω → {0, 1} be projections on respectively the first, second and i + 2-th coordinate. C represents the criminal, S the selected individual, and Γ i = 1 indicates that the i-th individual has characteristic Γ. Without any reference to the crime, but with reference to the particular characteristic Γ, we can model the characteristics Γ i and the choice of S by defining the following basic belief assignment on Ω. Let y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ∈ {0, 1} be such that
for all x ∈ X, and m(A) = 0 for all other subsets of Ω. We will typically write {S = x, Γ 1 = y 1 , . . . , Γ N +1 = y N +1 } for the set in (2.6) and similar ones later on, and not explicitly mention the first coordinate. This basic belief assignment expresses the facts that characteristics are random and independent with success probability p and that S is chosen uniformly on X. But also, and very importantly, it says nothing about the crime and nothing about the identity of the criminal C. For instance, for all x ∈ X, we assign zero belief to the event that C = x.
In the theory we are about to develop, classical probability distributions are replaced by the more general belief functions, allowing for more flexibility. In Examples 2.4 and 2.6 above, the basic belief assignments reflect prior knowledge, or the absence thereof. As such it it reasonable to call the basic belief assignments and the corresponding belief functions our priors in these examples. These priors play the same role as the prior probabilities in the classical situation, with the crucial difference that they need not be a classical probability distribution anymore. As such they need not be additive and they can be genuinely uninformative if that is what corresponds to reality.
Whereas belief functions are in general not additive, it follows directly from the definition that they are superadditive, i.e.
for all disjoint A, B ⊆ Ω. The following theorem by Shafer shows that belief functions are characterized by a property between additivity and superadditivity. We end this section with one more remark about the relation between belief functions and classical probability distributions. There is a natural way to identify a belief function with a collection of probability distributions, namely the collection P Bel of all probability distributions that one can obtain by distributing a total mass of m(C) over the elements of C, for all C ⊆ Ω. For instance, if m(Ω) = 1, then the corresponding P Bel consists of all probability distributions on Ω. If Ω = {0, 1}, and m({0}) = 1 − m({0, 1}) = 1 3 , then P Bel consists of all probability distributions that assign probability at least 1 3 to 0. It is not difficult to see that Bel(A) = min
(2.10)
Indeed, only for sets C which are completely contained in A, their mass m(C) contributes to Bel(A), and those are precisely the sets whose mass cannot be moved outside A. This identity could lead to the idea to interpret belief functions as uncertainty as to which element of P Bel is the "correct" one, still keeping the idea that the actual situation is described by an (unknown) probability distribution from the collection P Bel . We do not adhere to this viewpoint for two reasons. The first reason is philosophical in nature: why assuming that there is a classical probability distribution underlying the phenomena of interest if there is no need to do so? The second reason is more practical: in the next section we will see that our notion of conditioning, which we think is most natural, is in fact incompatible with this interpretation of belief functions.
A calculus of belief functions
The next item on the agenda is to investigate how belief functions change when additional or new information is provided. This is akin to the classical situation in which a prior probability is updated into a posterior one as we briefly mentioned in the introduction. In this section we explain how this works in our setting. The first thing to do is to determine how a belief function changes under additional information, or under a certain hypothesis. This means we need to understand how conditioning works in our context.
Conditioning
The rule we propose for conditioning is described as follows. Suppose we have a basic belief assignment m and corresponding belief function Bel. We want to condition on an event H. The weight of the evidence m(A) for A now becomes weight of evidence for A ∩ H, if A is consistent with H in the sense that A ∩ H = ∅. If A ∩ H = ∅, then the new weight of evidence for A becomes zero. Next we rescale the weights of the evidence in such a way that the weights again sum up to 1. This can of course only be done if there is evidence with positive weight that is consistent with H. This leads to the following definition. 
for A = ∅ and m H (∅) = 0. The corresponding conditional belief function
Readers familiar with the work of Shafer [20] will notice that our notion of conditioning is sometimes called Dempster-conditioning. This name is somewhat misleading though. Indeed, Shafer derives the formula as a special case of Dempster's rule, a rule which we reject. It so happens that one can naturally define conditional belief without using Dempster's rule.
In the special case that Bel = P is a probability distribution, our notion of conditional belief coincides with the notion of conditional probability. Indeed, in that case we can write
for every A ⊆ Ω and H such that 1 − Bel(H c ) = P (H) > 0.
Example 3.2. Suppose we have a case in which the suspects are two parents and their son, so Ω = {Father, Mother, Son}. We have a lot of evidence that points to the parents, none of which points to one of them in particular. Further, we have some evidence that points to the son. The corresponding basic belief assignment is, say, m({Father, Mother}) = However, as we will show now, conditional belief is not the same as the minimum of the corresponding conditional probabilities over the collection of probability distributions P Bel which we introduced after Example 2.3. This gives one argument not to adhere to the aforementioned interpretation of belief functions. In [15] we discuss the interpretation matter in much more detail. The collection of probability measures that we can obtain by distributing the weight on {Father, Mother} over {Father} and {Mother} would be
where the probability distribution P c : 2 Ω → [0, 1] is given by
we find min
Compared to (3.4), we think the answer in (3.4) seems more appropriate than the one in (3.8). The expression in (3.8) is sometimes called FHconditioning, after Fagin and Halpern [9] .
Independence
Now that we have a notion of conditioning, we can also introduce a notion of independence, and to this end we consider the following situation. Let Ω 1 and Ω 2 be outcome spaces of two phenomena that we would describe as 'independent'. Now we consider these two phenomena simultaneously. We set Ω := Ω 1 ×Ω 2 and let X : Ω → Ω 1 and Y : Ω → Ω 2 be the projections onto respectively the first and second coordinate. On Ω we define a basic belief assignment m : 2 Ω → [0, 1] and corresponding belief function Bel. We want m and Bel to reflect the 'independent' nature of the two phenomena. To do that, we need a mathematical definition of independence that is consistent with our intuitive idea about 'independence'.
There are now at least three ways to proceed. In the first approach we take conditional beliefs as the starting point, and require that
and
for all A ⊆ Ω 1 and B ⊆ Ω 2 for which the conditional beliefs are defined. It is not difficult to show directly that (3.9) and (3.10) are equivalent, but this will follow also from Theorem 3.3 below, so we do not prove this here.
In the second approach, we proceed via a product form for the belief Bel(X ∈ A; Y ∈ B). As a natural generalization of independence in probability theory, we require that this is equal to the product of the 'marginal' beliefs, i.e.
Bel(X ∈
Instead of looking at a product form for Bel(X ∈ A; Y ∈ B), we could also look at a product form for m(X ∈ A; Y ∈ B), which is our third approach. We first define Bel 1 and Bel 2 to be the 'marginal' belief functions, i.e.
Bel 1 (A) := Bel(X ∈ A) and Bel 2 (B) := Bel(Y ∈ B) (3.12)
for all A ⊆ Ω 1 and B ⊆ Ω 2 . Now let m 1 and m 2 be the corresponding 'marginal' basic belief assignments of respectively Bel 1 and Bel 2 . Since 13) it follows that we can express m 1 as
A similar expression of course is true for m 2 . Notice that m 1 (A) is in general not the same as m(X ∈ A), since the set {X ∈ A} is in general not the only set with positive basic belief which projects onto A. Our third approach to independence requires that
for all A ⊆ Ω 1 and B ⊆ Ω 2 . It turns out that the requirements of the first two approaches are weaker than the requirement of the third. However, if we add a natural additional constraint for to the first two requirements, all three approaches become equivalent, as expressed in the following theorem which we prove in [15] . This additional constraint is that m only takes positive values on 'rectangular' sets, i.e. C ⊆ Ω with C = X(C) × Y (C). We say that m concentrates on rectangles if this is the case. 
for all A ⊆ Ω 1 and B ⊆ Ω 2 with Bel(Y ∈ B c ) = 1.
m concentrates on rectangles and
for all A ⊆ Ω 1 and B ⊆ Ω 2 .
We have
Because it is the shortest formulation, we take the requirement of the third approach to be our actual definition of independence. We will come across an application of our theory of independence in Section 4.2 below.
The island problems
Now that we have established and discussed the main theoretical issues, we move on to our first important examples, namely the well known and classical island problems. The context of the island problems is classical. A crime has been committed on an island with N + 1 inhabitants, so that we can be sure that one of them is the culprit. Now some characteristic of the criminal, e.g. a DNA profile, is found at the scene of the crime and we may assume that this profile originates from the culprit. Then we somehow select an individual s from the island, who happens to have the same characteristic as the criminal. The question is what we can say about the probability or belief in the event that s is in fact the criminal. This is not a well defined question yet, as it depends on the way s was found. We distinguish between two cases: the cold case in which we randomly select an inhabitant, and the search variant in which we consider the inhabitants one by one in a random order, until we find an inhabitant with the characteristic found at the crime scene.
With the island problems, our belief functions allow us to assign a zero prior belief in the guilt of any of the individuals of the island, while at the same time assigning belief one to the full populations. This seems better suited to the legal context than the classical Bayesian setting since assigning a non-zero prior probability to an individual, without any evidence against the individual itself other than belonging to the population, seems unreasonable. Of course, we have to make modeling assumptions, as in the classical case and we will discuss these below. But as we shall see, the outcomes are different from the classical outcome: if we assume total prior ignorance the belief that s is the culprit is in our setting different from the classical probability that he is guilty under a uniform prior. We turn to the examples now.
The cold case
We continue Example 2.6. Recall that X = {1, . . . , N + 1} is the population of the island. At the scene of the crime a DNA profile Γ is found which we know has frequency p ∈ (0, 1] in the population. We set Ω = X × X × {0, 1} N +1 and let C : Ω → X, S : Ω → X and Γ i : Ω → {0, 1} be projections on respectively the first, second and i + 2-th coordinate. C represents the criminal, S the selected individual, and Γ i = 1 indicates that the i-th individual has characteristic Γ. Without any reference to the crime, but with reference to the particular characteristic Γ, we can model the characteristics Γ i and the choice of S by defining the following basic belief assignment on Ω. Let y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ∈ {0, 1} be such that
for all x ∈ X, and m(A) = 0 for all other subsets of Ω. This basic belief assignment and the corresponding belief function form our prior in this case. We denote the set at the left hand side by A(x, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ). Now we want to incorporate the crime and condition on the event H s = {S = s, Γ C = Γ S = 1} that s ∈ X was chosen, and that the criminal C and the chosen s both have characteristic Γ. According to our theory of conditioning, we have to assign the mass originally assigned to A(x, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) in (4.1) to the intersection of this set with H s , and normalize suitably. Clearly, this intersection is non-empty only if x = s and y s = 1, and in this case the intersection A(s, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) ∩ H s can be written as
Next we need to find the correct normalization. We claim that the total mass of sets of the form in (4.1) which have non-empty intersection with H s is given by
Note that one can obtain the outcome at the right hand side by either computing the sum, or by simply noticing that for the intersection to be non-empty it is necessary and sufficient that s = x and that y s = 1. Since (4.1) describes a classical probabilistic experiment, the total mass of the basic belief assignment that has non-empty intersection with H s , is just the probability that in this classical experiment, S = s and y s = 1. This happens with probability p/(N + 1).
It follows that for y 1 , . . . , y N +1 such that y s = 1 and
Summarizing, we have that for y 1 , . . . , y N +1 such that y s = 1 and
(4.4) Another way of writing this is as follows: for any A ⊂ X such that s ∈ A and |A| = k + 1, we have, writing 1 A (i) for 1 {i∈A} ,
(4.5) This is the new basic belief assignment after conditioning on H s and can be called the posterior in this case.
We can now use this result to compute belief in certain events, but before we do that, we would like to discuss the chosen modeling. We defined the basic belief assignment m without using that we know that someone in the population has Γ, namely the criminal C; this information is only added once we condition on H s . Perhaps some readers might find this somewhat counterintuitive. Why not use the information that there is at least one individual in X which has Γ in the definition of the basic belief assignment? We now explain how this can be done, and show that it leads to the same belief assignment after proper conditioning.
Let y 1 , . . . , y N +1 be such that i y i = k + 1, k = 0, . . . , N . We define the basic belief assignment m ′ as follows:
This belief assignment gives us our belief in the characteristics Γ i conditioned on the event that at least one y i is equal to 1. It expresses no knowledge about the identity of C other than that we know that C has Γ. We denote the event in (4.6) by A ′ (x, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ).
Next we condition on the event H ′ s = {S = s, Γ S = 1}. As before, H ′ s ∩ A ′ (x, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) can only be nonempty if x = s and y s = 1. In that case H ′ s ∩ A ′ (x, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) is exactly the event in (4.2) and the correct normalization is
It now follows that after conditioning we obtain the same belief assignment as before, since the extra term 1 − (1 − p) N +1 appears in both the numerator and the denominator. We conclude that the two approaches lead to the same result, as they should. Now that we have computed the new basic belief assignment, we can compute our belief in certain events, most notably our belief in the event that C ∈ B for B ⊂ X. It follows from the formulas that our belief in C ∈ B can only be positive if the chosen s ∈ B. This is of course very reasonable, since we started out with no knowledge whatsoever, and if s / ∈ B there is nothing we have learned about C being in this set B or not. If however s ∈ B then we have learned something: . . . ; Γ N +1 = 1 A (N + 1))
An interesting special case occurs when B = {s}. The conditional belief that C = s is apparently given by
simply take |B| = 1. This formula has a simple interpretation: the belief that s is the criminal is just the probability that all other members of the population are excluded since they have the wrong profile. It is interesting to compare this answer to the classical one, in which a uniform prior is taken. In the classical case, the posterior probability that C = s is equal to
see e.g. [23] or [3] . We observe that
(4.11) Hence in our setting, the belief that C = s is always smaller than in the classical case, something we can intuitively understand by recalling that we assign prior belief zero to this event. To give some indication of the difference between the two answers, if p ∼ N −1 (for N → ∞), then (4.10) ∼ 1 2 , while (4.9) ∼ e −1 .
Since belief functions generalize probability distributions, we should be able to re-derive the classical result (4.10) using our approach, and we now show that this is indeed the case. If we want to take a uniform prior for the criminal, then the basic belief assignment, denoted by m c , is as follows. Let y 1 , . . . , y N +1 be such that
12) for all t, x ∈ X, and m c (A) = 0 for all other subsets of Ω. Note that the corresponding belief function is a probability distribution, since only singletons have positive basic belief. Next we condition on the same event H s = {S = s, Γ C = Γ S = 1} as before. The intersection of the set in (4.23) with H s is only non-empty if s = x and y s = y t = 1. The probability that s = x and y s = 1 is p/(N + 1) as before. Given this, the probability that also y t = 1 is 1 if t = s and p if t = s. Hence the intersection is non-empty with probability
We can now compute the conditional belief assignment m c Hs but we note that we only need (with y s = 1 and
Summing over all k = 0, . . . , N and using Newton's binomium, we see that the conditional belief that S = C = s is given by (4.10), as required.
This example illustrates that we lose nothing by working with belief functions, and that belief functions only add flexibility. If a certain classical prior is reasonable then we can take that prior and work with it. If there are reasons to have a non-classical prior, for instance complete ignorance within a given population, then belief functions are flexible enough to deal with this.
The cold case generalized
So far we have assumed that we can describe the realization of the characteristic with a classical probability distribution with independence between different individuals. The flexibility that is possible with belief functions was only used in order to model complete ignorance about the culprit.
But is is possible to be even more flexible with our knowledge of the characteristics, and use belief functions also for them. This entails a certain uncertainty about the occurrence of the characteristic Γ. We still attach belief p > 0 to an individual having the property, but now attach belief q ≤ 1 − p to an individual not having the property. This means that we assign belief 1−p−q ≥ 0 to complete ignorance about the characteristic of a given individual, for instance because of measurement problems or otherwise. We do want the characteristics to be independent in the sense of Definition 3.4 though.
To be more precise, we let m ′ be the basic belief assignment on {0, 1} defined by m ′ ({1}) = p, m ′ ({0}) = q and m ′ ({0, 1}) = 1 − p − q =: r. This basic belief assignment describes our belief in the presence of the characteristic for a given individual. Note that when r = 0 we are back in the cold case. The basic belief assignment m ′′ on the product space {0, 1} N +1 corresponding to N + 1 individuals which yields independence between the characteristics of the N + 1 individuals, is given by the generalization of (3.4) to N + 1 dimensions, and can be written as
where Y i ∈ {{0, }, {1}, {0, 1}} and
. This all leads to the following prior basic belief assignment m on Ω = X × X × {0, 1} N +1 as the analogue of (4.1):
From here on, the analysis is more or less as before. We denote the set in (4. 
(4.14)
The total mass of these sets is
for the same reason as before. Hence we have the posterior
For s ∈ B we find Bel
When r = 0 this is just (4.9) as it should. It is noteworthy that the belief in C ∈ B only depends on |B| and q, and not on p and r. This is to be expected: the belief that s is the criminal is the probability that we know for sure that all other members of the population do not have the correct profile.
The search case
In the search variant, we do not choose a random individual S but we check the inhabitants one by one in a random order, until an individual with the relevant characteristic is found. As in the cold case, there are (at least) two ways to approach the situation. In the first approach, we do not immediately link the characteristic to the crime, and then it is a priori not certain that an individual with the characteristic found at the scene of the crime exists in the population. In the second approach, we condition the distribution of the characteristics on the fact that we know at least one individual has it. For the first approach, the space Ω must be rich enough to accommodate the possibility that no one has the characteristic. To this end, we set Ω = X × X ∪ { * } × {0, 1} N +1 and let C : Ω → X, S : Ω → X ∪ { * } and Γ i : Ω → {0, 1} be projections on respectively the first, second and i+2-th coordinate. If no one has the characteristic we set S = * to encode that we could not find a suspect (which is only the case if Γ 1 = Γ 2 = · · · = Γ N +1 = 0). If at least one individual has the characteristic, it is clear that S is uniformly selected from the subset of individuals that have the trait. Let x ∈ X. For y 1 , . . . , y N +1 such that i y i = k, k = 1, . . . , N + 1, and y x = 1 we set our prior basic belief assignment as follows:
Note that there are two differences compared to the cold case: we have to assume that y x = 1, and we have to divide by k rather than by N + 1.
Next we link the characteristic to the crime and we condition on H s = {S = s, Γ C = Γ S = 1}. Note that the conditioning does not contain information about the length of the search or the identity of searched individuals. We only know that s was the first one to be found with the characteristic. We have, for y 1 , . . . , y N +1 such that y s = 1,
Note that the sets in (4.18) are the only subsets of Ω with positive mass that have a nonempty intersection with H s . Hence the normalization follows from the total mass of such sets, which is equal to
Notice that we can derive 
Now we can compute our belief in certain events. For instance, our belief in {C = s} is given by
which is different compared to the cold case. Notice that (4.21) equals zero if p = 1 and if p < 1 we can rewrite (4.21) as
There is a very natural interpretation of the expression in (4.21). In the numerator, we have the probability that a binomially distributed random variable with parameters N + 1 and p is equal to 1. The denominator is the probability that this random variable is positive, so (4.21) is the conditional probability for such a random variable to be 1 given it is positive. This makes sense, since we can only know for sure that C = s when s is the only one with the characteristic. As already mentioned above, there is the alternative approach in which we deduce from the characteristic found at the crime scene that at least one individual has the characteristic. In this case we do not need the extended Ω since S = * has probability zero. For y 1 , . . . , y N +1 such that y x = 1 and i y i = k + 1, k = 0, . . . , N , the basic belief assignment is now given by m ′ (C ∈ {i :
After this, we condition on H ′ s = {S = s}. It is easily seen that the normalizing factor is just 1/(N + 1), and this immediately leads to the same formula as in (4.21).
In the classical case, starting with a uniform probability distribution, the posterior probability that C = s is equal to Hence the answer using our approach is -as it was in the cold case -smaller than the classical answer.
We briefly demonstrate that we can also derive this classical result with our technology. In the classical case, the basic belief assignment is given by
24) whenever i y i = k, and
Note that the corresponding belief function is a probability measure, since only singletons have positive basic belief assignments. We condition on H s = {S = s, Γ C = Γ s = 1} as usual. To compute the (classical) belief in C = s conditioned on H s we need to compute the conditional basic belief assignment m c Hs , for which we need the correct normalizing constant and the total mass of sets in (4.24) whose intersection with H s is not empty. Elementary combinatorics gives that the latter is equal to
The normalizing constant follows from the total mass assigned to sets whose intersection with H s is non-empty. For this intersection to be non-empty, we need that x = s, y s = 1 and y C = 1. In the classical probabilistic experiment described by m c , we simply need to compute the probability that H s occurs. We need subsequently (1) y C = 1, and (2) s is chosen (implying that y s = 1). The first step occurs with probability p. Given this, we now know that not all labels are 0, and every individual has the same probability to be chosen. Hence, the conditional probability of
Step (2) given
Step (1) is simply 1/(N + 1). It follows that the correct normalizing constant is p/(N + 1). Combining this with (4.26) yields (4.23).
Parental identification
Our next example concerns the situation in which we have a known mother and a known child, but we do not know who the father is. We assume that there is a set X = {1, . . . , N + 1} of potential fathers. We would like to make belief statements about the possible father-ship of someone chosen from the population, based on the DNA profile of this chosen person. In order to keep things as simple as possible, we assume that we only consider one specific locus of the DNA. Furthermore, we assume that the alleles of mother and child at that locus are such that we know what the paternal allele must be. Every potential father i in X has two alleles at the locus, and we denote by Γ i the number of 'correct' alleles matching the paternal allele, hence Γ i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In order to set up our prior belief function, we set Ω = X × X × {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2} N +1 and let F : Ω → X, S : Ω → X, A : Ω → {0, 1} and Γ i : Ω → {0, 1, 2} be projections on respectively the first, second, third and i + 3-th coordinate. F represents the father, and S the selected individual which is the putative father. The indicator A is associated with the putative father, and is only relevant if the putative father has exactly one 'correct' allele; in that case A = 1 means that he passes on this correct allele to his child, while A = 0 indicates that he does not do that. As said above already, Γ i is the number of alleles of the right type of the i-th potential father. Let p 0 , p 1 and p 2 be the probabilities that an individual has 0, 1 respectively 2 alleles of the right type. We assume that we know these probabilities from population surveys. Set k j := N +1 i=1 1(y i = j) for j = 0, 1, 2. Then the prior basic belief assignment is given by
As before, this basic belief assignment is a summary of what we know, and is formulated in terms of items that can be well described by classical probabilities. The factor 1 2 comes from the fact that a father passes a randomly chosen allele to his child. Note that the basic belief assignment in (5.1) only assigns positive basic belief to sets that contain no information whatsoever about the father, other than the fact that he belongs to the given population. We denote the event in (5.1) by A(x, a, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ). Now we have to distinguish between two scenarios: the suspect in question has one or two alleles of the right type. We look at the case he has two such alleles first. This means we want to condition on
We have to assign the mass originally assigned to A(x, a, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) to the intersection of this set with H s,2 , and normalize suitably. This intersection is non-empty precisely when x = s and y s = 2, and as before, the total mass of this can be calculated by viewing the basic belief assignment in (5.1) as a classical probabilistic experiment, leading to a normalizing constant of
3)
It follows that if y s = 2 we have the posterior
We claim that this basic belief assignment leads to the following posterior belief function: if B is such that s ∈ B, then
One can compute this analogously to the computation leading to (4.8), but we can also convince ourselves from the correctness of this answer as follows: If a = 1, then we are back in the classical cold case of the island problem, with p replaced by 1 − p 0 , since one correct allele will be enough now. If, on the other hand a = 0 then the situation reduces to the cold case of the island problem with p = p 2 , since a potential father now needs two alleles. This idea can also be used to simplify the combinatorics and to perform a more direct calculation, leading to the same answer of course.
Next we consider the case in which we condition on
Now A(x, a, y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) ∩ H s,1 can only be non-empty if x = s and y s = 1. Note however that if a = 0 and y i = 2 for all i then the intersection is in fact empty. The latter occurs with probability 1 2 (p 0 + p 1 ) N , and hence the correct normalizing constant is
It follows (except when a = 0 and y i = 2 for all i) that we have the posterior
We can now compute the corresponding posterior belief function using a similar argument as the one which led to (5.4). When a = 1 we have the same situation as before. When a = 0, we only need to rule out the case in which all labels y i are 0 or 1. This means that compared to the combinatorics of the previous case, we have to subtract (p 0 + p 1 ) N in this case. For s ∈ B we now get
In the special case in which B = {s} we find
and we note that (5.9) is smaller than (5.10), which is what common sense requires.
An analogue of Bayes' rule
In the context of belief functions, we do not have a useful explicit closed expression as the analogue of Bayes' rule as formulated in (1.1). However, we do have a similar process of updating prior belief statements when we are given additional knowledge. In this section we explain how the analogue of working with Bayes' rule works in our context, and how we can use it in computations with belief functions. We think this is best explained by analyzing a number of instructive example, and this is what we turn to now. We recall the odds form of Bayes' rule:
whereḠ denotes the negation or complement of G. (The rule can also be used whenḠ is not the complement of G but satisfies G ∩Ḡ = ∅.) Whatever the interpretation of the classical probability measure P , subjective, frequentistic or otherwise, P (G|E) represents the posterior probability of guilt conditioned on the available evidence, while P (G) denotes the prior probability of guilt, before taking the evidence E into account. One can, however, also look at the posterior odds from the perspective of the joint distribution of G and E. Once we have the full joint distribution, the posterior odds (and any other quantity relating E and G, for that matter) can be computed. Equation 6.1 in fact tells us that in the classical setup, the complete joint distribution of G and E can only be determined as a joint effort of both expert (likelihood ratio) and legal representative (prior). They both contribute to the joint distribution, albeit in different ways, and as such both contribute to the posterior odds as well. This means that to develop the analogue of Bayes' rule in our context of belief functions, we need to explain how the joint belief of G and E can be constructed, under a given prior belief on G (which may be complete ignorance).
Both G and E can, in our examples, only take values 0 and 1, where a 1 represents guilt and the existence of evidence, respectively. So we work on Ω = {0, 1} × {0, 1} where, for instance, the state (1, 0) corresponds to the situation that suspect is guilty, but there is no evidence against him or her. We start with a classical situation which we first compute with (6.1) and after that a second time from the perspective of belief functions. After that we present two examples which cannot be done in a classical way.
Example 6.1. (A classical situation) Suppose we would like to impose a prior probability of α that our suspect is guilty, and a prior probability 1 − α that he is not, for some α ∈ [0, 1]. We assume further that if the suspect is guilty, evidence is found with probability 0.8, and if he is not guilty, evidence is found with probability 0.05. This leads to prior odds of 1/9 and a likelihood ratio of 0.8/0.05 = 16. Hence the posterior odds are 16/9, and this corresponds to a posterior probability of guilt of 16/25 = 0.64. Now let us recompute this example in the context of belief functions. In this classical case this may appear as more work, but the point is of course that the forthcoming method can be extended to non-classical situations.
The assumptions imply that our basic belief assignment on {0, 1} 2 should be such that when we project on the first coordinate, we must have total mass 0.1 on G = 1 and mass 0.9 on G = 0. In combination with the other assumptions about the probabilities to find evidence under various hypotheses, this leads to the following basic belief assignment on {0, 1} 2 :
Conditioning on E = 1 means we disregard the first and third option since these sets have an empty intersection with E = 1. Only the last option gives mass to G = 1 after conditioning, and therefore the conditional probability that G = 1 given E = 1 is given by 0.08/(0.08 + 0.045) = 0.64, agreeing with the earlier computation.
Suppose now that we want to model complete ignorance about the guilt of our suspect. This boils down to the requirement that our basic belief assignment on Ω must be such that when we project any set with positive basic belief assignment on the first coordinate, we must get the full marginal {0, 1}. There are nine subsets of Ω with this property, and it is very instructive to list them and to decide whether or not each of them should be assigned positive basic belief assignment. This is more work than assigning conditional probabilities for application of the classical Bayes' rule, but the advantage is that we can very precisely model the possibly subtle relation between G and E. We list the possibilities as 2 by 2 arrays, hopefully increasing readability and clarity of the exposition.
We start with the three 'rectangular' sets, whose interpretation is straightforward: I:
II:
Interpretation: absence of evidence in all circumstances.
III:
Interpretation: existence of evidence in all circumstances.
The next possibility corresponds to the situation that evidence exists precisely when suspect is guilty. In ideal cases one would like to assign a lot of belief to this set.
IV:
Interpretation: incriminating evidence that exists precisely when suspect is guilty.
There are two perturbations of Option IV, namely with the possibilities of a false positive respectively false negative added: V:
Interpretation: as in Option IV but with false positive for incriminating evidence possible. Alternatively, we can interpret this as ruling out a false negative for incriminating evidence.
VI:
Interpretation: as in Option IV but with false negative for incriminating evidence possible. Alternatively, we can interpret this as ruling out a false positive for incriminating evidence.
The remaining options seem more suitable for exculpatory evidence: VII:
Interpretation: perfect exculpatory evidence.
The last two options are perturbations of Option VII.
VIII:
Interpretation: as Option VII with false positive for exculpatory evidence possible. Alternatively, we can interpret this as ruling out a false negative for exculpatory evidence.
IX:
Interpretation: as Option VII with false negative for exculpatory evidence possible. Alternatively, we can interpret this as ruling out a false positive for exculpatory evidence.
Obviously, the actual belief that one wants to assign to various possibilities depends on personal taste, background knowledge, and on details of the situation. This is not different from the situation when working in a classical setting. In the context of our belief functions, we need to decide about the assignment of prior belief to a relatively large number of sets. In our example above, we need to make decisions about 9 sets. To compare: in our example, a classical Bayesian analysis requires no more than 4 probabilities, namely the probabilities that E = i if G = j, for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. But our belief functions are much more flexible, and allow us to tailor the modeling very much to the actual situation.
Once we have decided about our basic belief assignment, we can perform computations with the calculus that we have developed in Section 3.
Example 6.2. (The cold case revisited) Consider the cold case from Section 4.1 once again, but now phrased in the terminology of this the current section. Suppose s is chosen, and {G = 1} corresponds to s being guilty. The event {E = 1} corresponds to the event that both s and C have the characteristic. We can now write down our basic belief assignment as follows.
First of all, 6) since this is our belief in the set that there is no evidence for sure, which is precisely the case when s does not have the characteristic. Then we have
since we know that there will be incriminating evidence precisely when everyone has the characteristic. Next we set 8) because this option corresponds to ruling out a false positive, which occurs when s is the only one with the characteristic. The remaining mass goes to
which makes perfect since, since this is the probability that s has the characteristic, and in addition there is at least one other person with the characteristic, and also at least one who does not have it. In this situation we have complete ignorance when it comes to s. (Note that for N = 2, the mass of the last option is 0. This is understandable, since we need at least three individuals for this option to be realized.) Next we condition on E = 1. The first set has empty intersection with {E = 1}, and following the rules of our calculus we compute that the conditional belief that G = 1 is equal to (1 − p) N , in accordance with (4.9).
What we have done here is analogous to the classical situation. We started out with a belief function on {0, 1} 2 which represented complete ignorance about the question whether or not the suspect is guilty, and which assigned positive basic belief to various possibilities. This is the analogue of a prior probability in the classical situation, together with the value of various conditional probabilities. Next we have conditioned on the event that E = 1 and we have calculated the ensuing conditional belief in G = 1. This is the analogue of calculating the conditional probability that G = 1 given E = 1 using Bayes' rule. Although we do not have an explicit formula like Bayes' rule at our disposal, we can nevertheless carry out the necessary calculations, leading to a well-defined answer.
We would like to emphasize once more that we lose nothing when we work with belief functions, compared to the classical probabilistic set-up. We can start out with a classical probability distribution as our prior, and mimic a classical situation. We illustrate this with an example.
The relevant sets in Example 6.2 were completely disjoint from the relevant sets in Example 6.1, but it may very well happen that we want to model both partial prior ignorance together with some partial specific prior belief. To this end we give our third example. Example 6.3. (A mixture of ignorance and specific belief) Consider the same situation as in the previous examples, but this time there is a prior indication that suspect is not guilty, say by a witness statement. Suppose we want to assign a total belief of 0.7 to this witness. Then the basic belief assigment m should assign a total mass of 0.7 to sets whose projection onto G is {0}. We have no indication about guilt, so m should assign the remaining mass of 0.3 to sets whose projection onto G is {0, 1}.
We now need to model what the probability of evidence is when suspect is not guilty. Suppose we have some reason to believe in false positives, but also some reason not to have any information about E at all when G = 0. These considerations could for example lead to the following prior belief assignment:
When we now condition on E = 1, the mass 0.5 of the first option is lost, so we have to renormalize by multiplying with 2. Hence we find that The original belief of 0.7 not being guilty by in the witness statement is reduced to 0.4 after the evidence, but note that uncertainty persists.
Working with belief functions rather than probability distributions may seem rather complicated. Due to the nature of the theory in which we assign probabilities to subsets rather than to singletons, there are many more objects which can receive positive mass in our set-up compared to the classical one. However, in many cases modeling assumptions can be made which can, and should for that matter, drastically reduce the number of sets with positive basic belief assignment. The computations themselves can of course be programmed.
Having explained how the analogue of applying Bayes' rule works in our context, a next step would be to investigate the analogue of a Bayesian network. Since we know how to mimic the working of Bayes' rule, we can now also create the analogue of a Bayesian network. This however, needs more space than we have in the current paper, and we carry out the construction of such a Bayesian networks in our context in a forthcoming paper.
Discussion and legal practice
How does the theory of belief functions as developed in this article relate tot the legal practice when expert witnesses are called to testify? It is to this question that we now turn.
We start by describing the current practice when classical probability theory is used. In this current practice, the legal representative (judge or jury member for instance) and expert witness play a very different role, and their contributions are well-separated. This is theoretically backed up by Bayes' rule. To be precise, writing G for the event, say, that a certain suspect is the donor of a DNA profile found at the scene of the crime), and E for the available evidence, the so called odds form of Bayes' rule states that
whereḠ denotes the negation or complement of G. Whatever the interpretation of the classical probability measure P , subjective, frequentistic or otherwise, P (G|E) represents the posterior probability of G conditioned on the available evidence, while P (G) denotes the prior probability of G, before taking the evidence E into account. Formula (7.1) describes how the prior odds P (G)/P (Ḡ) are transformed into the posterior odds P (G|E)/P (Ḡ|E), by multiplying the prior odds with the so-called likelihood ratio P (E|G)/P (E|Ḡ). This likelihood ratio is in the provenance of the forensic expert. This expert can, in certain circumstances at least, compute, estimate or assign a probability to the evidence under various hypothesis, and thereby compute the likelihood ratio. The expert does not express how likely these hypotheses themselves are, that is, the expert says nothing about the prior probabilities P (G) and P (Ḡ). Hence, the expert does not make a statement about the posterior probabilities P (G|E) and P (Ḡ|E). Indeed, for the latter probabilities, one in addition needs the priors and these are not in the provenance of the expert.
One can also look at the posterior odds from the perspective of the joint distribution of G and E. Once we have the full joint distribution, the posterior odds (and any other quantity relating E and G, for that matter) can be computed. But it is only through the joint effort of expert and legal representative that the joint distribution can be computed. In other words, the complete joint distribution of G and E can only be determined as a joint effort of both expert and legal representative. They both contribute to the joint distribution, albeit in different ways, and as such both contribute to the posterior odds as well.
Obviously, the legal practice is more complicated than this simple procedure suggests. Although Bayes' rule is mathematically not difficult, confusion between likelihood ratio and posterior odds arises easily, and there are many examples in which such confusion has had serious consequences see e.g. [8] and the references therein. But also, as already articulated in the introduction, there are many situations possible where a prior in the context of classical probability theory is not possible or at least not appropriate from a legal perspective. Furthermore, the clean theory about division of responsibilities between expert and legal representative does not always work this way: there are situations in which the prior actually enters the likelihood ratio, which complicates matters significantly, see e.g. [23] . Finally, it is highly questionable whether all available evidence is amenable to numerical manipulation.
The theory as developed in this article suggests a different procedure which does not suffer from some of the problems mentioned above and in the introduction. In the classical setting, Bayes' rule (7.1) explains that a posterior evaluation of probabilities is not possible without using explicit prior probabilities. The likelihood ratio provided by the forensic expert is used to transform the prior odds into posterior odds. Prior odds, or at least bounds on them, are needed, even if there is no knowledge to make a serious estimate or guess. The crux of the matter is that in our set-up, we do not impose a prior if we have no argument to assign it a certain value. That is, we can model this appropriately by assuming complete prior ignorance (apart from the assumption that we have an outcome in Ω) via the uninformative basic belief assignment given by m(Ω) = 1.
This means that the highly subjective act of imposing a prior can be replaced by simply modeling ignorance where appropriate, if that is what reality dictates. In such cases, the forensic expert can determine the joint belief structure of E and G without any need for input from the legal representative. In the classical case this is not possible, since a prior must be provided. (We recall that prior ignorance is often modeled by using a prior uniform distribution. However, these two things, ignorance on the one hand and uniform probabilities on the other, are certainly not the same thing as we have argued at some length in Section 1.)
The new procedure can be illustrated with the cold case in the island problem discussed in Section 4.1. In the classical case, the expert witness can only deliver the likelihood ratio, which in this case would be 1/p. Indeed, in the case that the suspect is guilty, the probability to find the evidence is 1, and in case he is not, the probability to find this particular profile is nothing but the frequency p of that profile in the population. With uniform prior this leads to the posterior in (4.10), but note that other priors would lead to different result. Note that in any case, a prior must be made explicit in order to arrive at posterior probabilities.
In our setting, the expert could simply report (4.9) which contains all the available information in the case. If we have no prior information, then no unfounded or subjective choice for a prior needs to be made, apart from the choice of the relevant population. We do not need a uniform prior. This means that the classical subdivision of tasks between legal representative and expert is no longer always necessary in our context. Anyone with knowledge about (in this case) the value of the frequency p (and the population size N ) can compute the conditional belief function in (4.9), but it is clear that in this case, and in many other cases, we will need the forensic expert to determine the value of p (or a related quantity in more complicated settings). In other words, the belief function governing the relation between E and G can now be computed just by the expert witness himself.
The calculation of the belief in a certain hypothesis (like G = 1 in the above examples) is conceptually simpler in the new setting. The joint distribution of E and G need no longer depend on inadequate or unfounded prior probabilities, but of course we always have the possibility to impose a real prior probability if there is reason to do so. But we have also seen in the examples in the island problem that the numbers obtained are certainly less impressive than in the classical case. This is of course not surprising: starting out with an uninformative prior instead of a uniform prior gives us less information to start with.
Is this a weakness of the theory of belief functions as we have set out in this paper? We do not think so. It is far better to have a less impressive number which is well founded and not so easy to challenge, than to have a more impressive number which may depend on unfounded arguments or assumptions, and which is easy to dismiss by, say, the defense. As such, our theory may even help to convict actual criminals, even though we insist that if there is no prior information about a certain quantity, we should not pretend there is.
In this article we have described the basic principles of our new theory, with basic forensic examples. Together with the more mathematical companion paper [15] , this gives a solid foundation of the theory. Obviously there is a lot of work to be done in the theoretical development and in applications to forensic examples.
